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“Need for mathematical basis should dominate one’s search for any new theory. 
Philosophical or physical ideas must be adjusted to fit mathematics. Not other way 
around. One ought to start with mathematical basis. One can tinker with philosophical or 
physical ideas to adapt them to mathematics, but mathematics cannot by tinkered with. It 
is subject to rigid rules and is restricted by logic. Distrust philosophical or physical 
concepts as basis for theory. One should concentrate on getting interesting mathematics 
and put one’s trust in it, even if it does not appear at first sight to be connected with 
physics. Equations of any theory are worked out before their physical meaning is 
obtained. Physical meaning follows behind mathematics. Physical interpretation is 
obtained only after mathematical basis is obtained” (Dirac 1978; abridged). Distributions 
such as x  = 0 for  where 0x   x x   = 1, for instance, are not functions, but they 
are mathematical basis of physics (Dirac 1927). 
 
 
Abstract. Preferences of individuals are distributions of elements generated by generalized 
functions. Models of economic decision-making derived from such distributions are consistent 
with results of physiological experiments, and explain any behavioral situations without 
simplifying assumptions. Quantities in such models precisely correspond to experimentally 
obtainable physiological observables which determine statistical properties of central nervous 
system as it represents different stimuli. Graphical method of consistently and quantitatively at-
a-glance interpreting or visualizing physiological data within context of economic models is 
demonstrated. [77 words]   
 
 
§1 
Sensation of person Ч  classifies geometrical locations  *L E  of external physical 
environment *E  into equivalence-classes Э E , creating external perceived environment E , 
whose geometry elements are variable-quantities    defined on intersections of equivalence-
classes or “things” . “We cannot perceive or sense absolute change. We can only perceive 
or sense relative difference, or change from past configuration” (Boskovich 1755). So, if  = 
Э E
JF
FJ  =  and  =  (Menger 1944), then measurement F JN N :M E    assigns distinguishable 
“labels” or “stimuli” {
 
}J [ ,..., }]{N     = { }N N   as , which are different unique 
real-numbers, to different unique boundaries at which some equivalence-classes transition to 
other equivalence-classes, and thus, are distinguishable one from other. For instance, drop at 
table-edge is boundary transition by which floor is distinguished from table-top.  
N 
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One-and-only criterion of mapping M  is distinguishability of real-numbers 
{ }[ { ,..., }]J N     = { }  = {…, ' , '' , ''' , …}. They are different “labels” or “names.” 
They are combined without ambiguity according to mapping M  with different intersections of 
equivalence-classes  = {  = {... , , , , …}, because such 
intersections are different boundaries of “things.” Different “labels” or “names” correspond to 
transition from one quantity of “things” to different quantity of identical “things,” transition 
from one quantity of “things” to identical quantity of different “things,” and so on. Any sequence 
of changes in boundary transition context of environment, along or within future null cone, 
which depolarize or hyperpolarize nerve-cells, “stimulate” receptive-fields of nerve-cells, or 
“excite” nerve-cells, are different “things,” e.g., different goods or money at different times. 
Ordered pair 
{
( J
}[N { ,JЭ   ...,}] }Э 'Э ''Э '''Э
    J   , J   ) J    is meaningless if [ J      J  < 0]   [ J      J  > 0]  
 [ J    J   0]  <   [ J    J    > .  0]
Different behavior or responses of person Ч   to different stimuli { }  correspond to 
differences between values { }[ { ,..., }]JV N   
}
 =  = {.. , , , , …}, which are 
mapped  to different stimuli {
{ }V . 'V ''V '''V
:F    , establishing ranking order. Differences in valuation 
are differences in attention or perception, and pleasure is “organizing” change or “growth” in 
state of brain neural network M  at synapses due to excitations arising from stimuli (Hebb 1949). 
For instance, growth in linkages within frontal areas of thalamus and connected areas of cerebral 
cortex would change intentional responses to search and consume problems, such as search for 
economic solutions, and simultaneously give pleasure (Pribram 1960). Different stimuli     
have different values V  mapped by  onto them by different people Ч , and so, 
different people exhibit different responses to identical stimuli or identical responses to different 
stimuli. Their behavior changes over time, because  changes over time due excitation-initiated 
growth at synapses. “Preferences” are merely different stimuli; they are not “rational” at all; they 
cannot be chosen; neither helping other people at cost to self nor satisfying self exclusively is 
more or less “rational”; pleasure is change of state of brain by excitation-initiated growth of 
synapses caused by different sequences excitations, whose only physiological qualities are their 
distinguishability, novelty, and more or less organizing effect on already existing state of neural 
network, so that some order of stimuli is “preferred”; people cannot do something contrary to 
pleasure, as opposed to because of pleasure (Leibniz 1700; Hebb 1949).  
  F 
F
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Pain is evoked if stimuli are encountered in order that is different from preferences, i.e., 
“preferences are not satisfied.” Preferences are not magnitudes, but topological changes in neural 
network of brain.  
Environment which Ч  senses is single geometrical manifold whose elements are  , in 
space , and “wraps” around “things.” Different qualities of distinguishable things are indicated 
by sets in neighborhood of each point 
E
1M     E , to which each point belongs. Physical 
environment  underlying  may be very different from what Ч  perceives. Physical things 
may have geometries and qualities which are very different from what Ч  thinks, but Ч  behaves 
only according to differences between elements which their senses distinguish. Everything else 
has no influence on their behavior. They do not know about it. Things, insofar as they determine 
behavior of Ч , are merely different deformations of single geometrical manifold, which extends 
only insofar as senses and thoughts of Ч  extend, and which envelopes Ч  or surrounds them 
from all directions, at any moment. If small perturbation away from starting point in our single 
geometrical manifold leads to any other point which is in identical equivalence class as starting 
point, i.e., all points in neighborhood of starting point are in single equivalence-class, then 
neighborhood of starting point was “stable,” so that small change in stimulus leads to small 
change in response. If several or infinitely many equivalence-classes intersect in neighborhood 
of starting point, then small perturbation from starting point in one set lead to another point 
which is in different equivalence-class, which is called “bifurcation,” so that small change in 
stimulus leads to great change in response.  
*E E
To anticipate or describe actions or behavior of set of people {... ,    ,  'Ч  ''Ч    , 
   , … }, we analyze sums of ’s or co-chains of commutative functions defined on 'e  
 , '     , …, '       …  
'''Ч
 e

e
F
e''  ''e  '''e e  ''  '''e   Pe    ,  if they are not empty, 
where 'e , , , …, 
E
''e '''e  Pe
 
    { } , where{  is set of coverings of , and where '  = { / 
[      …   
Э }Э *E e }Э
''e  '''e Pe ],  = { / [ 'e     …  ''e }Э  '''e   Pe ],  = { / [      …  '''e }Э 'e '' e 
 Pe ], …,  Pe  = { / [ 'e     …  }Э  '' e   P e ], up to -fold intersection, because class of 
ordered pairs 
P
( , )M F , which defines class of ordered 3-tuples ( ,Э , )V , determines actions or 
behavior (e.g., Eilenberg & Steenrod 1952; Wells 1980). Then, we ask: What “action” or 
tangent-space Б    E  or what “behavior” or tangent-space *Б    *E  maximizes F    , 
given “controls” or preferences of person Ч

 ? (e.g., Rosen 1980)  
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Let J  =   and  ( ,..., )P A B l  = P , so that labels l  = , …, , where 
measurement  maps different intersections of {  which are removed, 
according to rules , …, 
 { Al   }Bl
:   oM E   }Э
A B , to real numbers A , …, B , respectively. In environment , all 
changes have corresponding variable-quantity labels in this way.  Let 
E
  = , '{...  , '' , ''' ,  
 [   . If  = , 
...}
   ] d /d dJ Pd / = P PJd d  , 
Pl
d  = / P l ,  PPld  =  /P PP  l , and operator 
 = , then O     J     lkl O d   =   k d  and  = Od , ,   l ldl k
F
. “Information” about 
values, in sense that we require it, is “influence structure” of , which is set of answers of kind 
 to following set of questions: if l  changes, what happens to ? (Rosen 1984)  
F
 
{
l
d }F
If several simultaneous changes in environment are investigated, then we seek set of 
answers of kind { '
A

l
d … }. In fact, any question we are interested, however complicated, in 
may answered by selecting coefficients {
...
B
F
l
d
}[ { ,..., }]J N   k




 
l
k d
 = {  = {... , , , , , 
labeling environmental changes, and computing: , which is arbitrary part of 
“influence structure” of . And so, we need to know how to determine  in most general way.  
}k
F
'k ''k '''k ...}
l
F F
 
 
§2 
Mapping :[ ]F     [ ] V  , which is continuous or dispersed, of stimuli { }  to 
values , is generated as right-hand limiting sum across real boundary, by equivalence-class 
 of pairs of analytic functions, [
{ }V
F :[F    + ]i      V  , :[F      ]i    
 ], which are different flows in complex domains above and below real boundary, 
respectively, where 
 V 
(F     )  = [ (F   + )i  , (F     )]i   =  (0lim  F   + i )    (F   
  )i   = [   ] , and because many different pairs of analytic functions generate identical 
distribution of values in such way, we may always choose [
V  
, ]F F 
F
 so that hierarchical order of 
values , , ,  is not changed by transformation { 'V ''V '''V ...}    (Kothe 1952; Sato 1958; 
Schapira 1972; Isao 1992).  
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Let  = [   ,  =   ] , and  be ring of all regular analytic 
functions in open complex-neighborhood  
re   ]J arg [ 
(D S
J
)
( ( ))D Sr
   of open section   S    restricted to real-
line. Let, then,  be ring of all regular analytic functions in complex neighborhood of 
 excluding those exactly on . If 

( (D S) / )Sr
S S   = {      a  rg  > 0 , }   = {         arg  < 
, then equivalence-relation [  = 0} F F  if   D   , F  if   ]   is 
generalized function or hyper-function, and  =  is set of every hyper-
function defined on  (Kothe 1952; Sato 1958; Sato 1959). A sheaf co-homology definition of 
 is required for set of every hyper-function defined on real-manifold , or sum of such 
manifolds (which is required for analysis of behavior of individual person derived from function 
, and for behavior of many people), but this is treated in §3 of this paper, whereas §2 of this 
paper considers function  for one person (Sato 1960; Kashiwara, Kawai, & Sato 1973).  
D
(

(D Sr

))

m
(r (D S) / )S
( )Sv ( ( ) / ) /D S Sr
S
(v m )
F
F
Equivalence-class nature of generalized functions, encompassing many pairs of 
components, allows us to require that hierarchical order of values is not changed by conformal 
re-scaling  =  of metric corresponding to conformal re-scaling F F  { }[ { ,..., }]JV N   
J
 = 
 of values, in space . Thus, ordered pair { }[ { }]J J ,...,V N  E (V     JV , JV  JV  )  is 
meaningless if ( JV   < JV  < )JV   = ( JV   <  JV  <  )JV 
F
. Magnitudes may be increased or 
decreased, in any way, if angles between geometrical elements, which represent values in metric 
space, are preserved (e.g., Penrose 1964; 1968). That is,   is marginal utility distribution or 
anticipated preferences. Of course, preferences are always merely expected, because action now 
can only satisfy wants in near or distant future when desired effect appears: real hierarchical 
ranking of distinguishable stimuli is limiting sum of two continuous functions of complex 
variable-quantities,   + i   and     i  , respectively, and if   + i   and     i   have 
physiological meaning, then activation-inhibition network of nerve-cells may be placed in 
quantitative correspondence with choices people make. These results all follow trivially from 
well-known theorems about generalized functions, hyper-functions, which generate distributions, 
and micro-functions, which describe properties of singular points of such distributions:  
1. every dispersed set generated by mapping , including any set which is not any kind 
of function, say, because its lacks consistent segmented “motion” 
F
( ( ), ( )) F      transitioning 
from every  to a A b B  in , :F A B , ,a b   (Menger 1954), e.g., hierarchical ordering 
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'V  <  in dispersed set-of-values { , where metric F  determines distance between  "V }V 'V   
 and    { }, is invariant to change in distance V  {V} ''V V '    arising from of expansion ''V F  
or from restriction F  (Cuhel 1907; Bernardelli 1934; 1936; 1938; 1939; 1952), may be treated 
as distribution of elements in real-space without causal quantitative connection in real-space, but 
with underlying quantitative causal connection in complex-space;  
2. every distribution of single real input may be generated as limiting sum of two analytic 
functions, and differentiation or integration may be applied to such functions; Leibniz’s Law of 
Continuity is vindicated mathematically, no meta-mathematical assumptions being necessary;  
3. every two different generating functions of most general kind,  and , have 
addition defined for them, but multiplication of two different generating functions is not defined 
at all, and neither  nor l  +  = 
'F ''F
'F F '' og F ' log ''F 'F F '')log  (  is defined, so that phase-space 
with common degrees of freedom does not exist in most general cases, prohibiting inter-personal 
comparisons of values for lack of common phase-space, no extra-mathematical assumptions 
being necessary (Sato 1958; Kashiwara, Kawai, & Sato 1973; Kashiwara 1980; Isao 1992).  
What precisely are complex-number   =   + i   and complex-conjugate   =    
i   in human central nervous system? Instead of trying to physically interpret  and    
directly, let us “encode”  and    onto physiological-“indicators”   and  , respectively, so 
that if  
1 1( ,
     
  

)
 
 

   
    
 ... 
... 
 ... 
 ... 
            
 
 
 



 , then            ) 
 
,
* ( , ,
M
M F
 
 
 

 
          ( ,
 
* (E V
E V
 

  

       
)
                        
)
F

(
(
V
V
, )
)
E
E
  commutes (e.g., Rosen 1962; 
1963; 1983). If we may physically interpret  ,  , 1 , and 1 , then our analysis may proceed. 
 
I At first, we may try something else: for indices 
I
 and ordered -tuples or 
“bundles”  of various quantities of different goods ,…,  satisfying 
 = 0 for indifference-curves Φ
N
}E1, ,
,N
, )I (
,Q
...,I NQ Q
)I I
1{G NG 
1,(U Q ,...,I 1,( ,..., ,I N )IQ Q  , if 1,(dQ / dI  , …, ,N IdQ / )d  
= ,…, , and  > ,…, , then person Ч1,( ,Φ ,...,I NQ Q(0 0) )I  (0 0)   values “bundles” 
corresponding to 'I ''I less than “bundles” corresponding to  if and only if ' ''I I  (Pareto 
1906a; 1909). As best explained by original inventor of this method, surprising problems prevent 
this method from describing most behavioral situations in our world. 
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“If order of consumption of several economic goods in any bundle is matter of 
indifference, one has system of indices of marginal utility which depend on quantities consumed. 
If order of consumption is not matter of indifference, one has system of indices of marginal 
utility which depend on consumption-paths followed. One individual, following some path 
during consumption of several economic goods in any bundle, starts at point , and 
moving from that point, consumes quantities . We assume: any individual 
chooses that consumption-path which gives this individual maximum satisfaction: first they 
consume , second they consume 
1, ,( ,..., )I NQ Q I
I1, ,( ,..., )I NdQ dQ
Y X , and so on. We shall assume that marginal utility does not 
dependent upon order of consumption. When marginal utility is not-dependent on order of 
consumption of goods, and is dependent only quantities of goods that are consumed, we can 
determine marginal utility” (Pareto 1906b; abridged). “If pleasure arising from consumption of 
 only depends on dX X , pleasure arising from consumption of  only depends on Y , and so 
on, or if pleasure arising from consumption of , …,  is different according to order 
of consumption of , …,  but we admit that we may experimentally determine and fix 
order of consumption of , …, , then we can construct indifference-functions as 
indices of choices. If order of consumption influences choices, we must necessarily fix order of 
consumption of , …,  before we can determine points of equilibrium or function of 
 which serves as index of choices” (Pareto 1909; abridged).  
dY
1,IdQ , )N IdQ(
1,IdQ
1,IdQ
,N IdQ
1,I
,N IdQ
dQ ,N IdQ
1,( ,Q,..., )I NQ I
What if bundles are expanded to include every distinguishable equivalence-class Э  E , 
or situations represented by stimulus 
1




   , as opposed to any restricted stimulus? Our 
world, without simplifying assumptions, is such a “choice-rich” environment, which introduces 
differences between predictions of any such economic model and behavior predicted.  

We cannot assume that order of consumption of perhaps infinitely many different 
quantities of different goods, within single bundle of goods, does not affect pleasure achieved 
from consuming such bundle of goods. In choice-rich environment, bundles of goods are 
supposed to be hierarchically ranked, and yet value of bundles is not defined unless order of 
consumption is defined, but order of consumption, is not fixed ahead of time, physiologically. 
Order of consumption is simultaneously determined with bundles, and change in it determines 
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change in value of bundles equally as much as change in quantities under consideration, but 
analysis of bundles of quantities leaves out analysis of order of consumption. If both are 
considered, then bundles no longer exclusively determine values, and we get dispersed set of 
hierarchically ordered real-numbers, which if it also supposed to be invariant under 
transformations, is not tractable in real-space if we wish to do further analysis. New 
mathematical basis is required. If we eat our food standing up, and then sit down, or if we sit 
down first and then eat our food, are these not different stimuli which give us different pleasure, 
and to which we react differently? If we must sometimes do one, and sometimes do other, our 
model must describe both situations differently. Only if we answer such a question for choice-
rich environments, is any model capable of giving behavioral predictions in physical 
environment  in which we really live. *E
 
Human central nervous system is activation-inhibition network of nerve-cells where 
excitations evoke changes at synapses according to processes at level of dendrites which are 
superposed over inhibitory background of changing magnitude (Rashevsky 1933; 1934; Hebb 
1949; Hayek 1952; Pribram 1986; 2003). Activity and excitation, of course, increases 
temperature of activation-inhibition network (Gerard & Serota 1938; Serota 1939). Also, volume 
diffusion transmission of free molecules causes bulk activation or inhibition, or bulk change in 
rate of activation or inhibition, at lower energy cost, wherever memory-related precision of 
activation-inhibition networks, is not required, e.g., readiness for motion, sensation of hunger, 
and so on (Bach-y-Rita 1993; 2005). Individual nerve-cells are spontaneously excited over time 
with regular frequency generated underlying wave-like processes in dendrites, or may be above 
and beyond excited or inhibited by environmental stimuli or connected nerve-cells (Rashevsky 
1933; 1934; Gerard & Young 1937; Gerard & Libet 1939; 1941).  
There is significant delay between when stimulus is and begins to cause modification of 
neural network and response and when it consciously felt, sensation being evoked only as 
dendritic changes as synapses occur, and vice versa, motivation is always unconscious, whereas 
consciousness, if present, is only ability to interrupt motivation, given later final state of neural 
network; earlier stimuli may be masked or enhanced by later stimuli according to clock time, and 
due to unconscious processing, internal time has no 1-to-1 correspondence with clock or proper 
time whatsoever; most stimuli are not consciously felt at all, but elicit unconscious conditioned 
or orienting responses (Condillac 1754a; 1754b; Sokolov 1958; Deecke & Kornhuber 1965; 
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Libet 1966; 1973; 1981; 2003; Alberts et al 1967; Feinstein et al 1979; Brass, Haynes, Heinze, & 
Soon 2008). 
Central nervous system covers geometry of physical environment  with 
distinguishable equivalence-classes  
*E
Э   E . It may only code, experiments show, however, 
auditory, tactile, and visual excitations in response to stimuli distinguished by neuronal model 
M , as probability-distribution functions, which are fully described predicted by postulating a 
barrier beginning at certain height which fluctuates while being approached by random-walk 
motion as function of proper time   parameterized by a positive drift-coefficient; at that point, 
one nerve-cell emits signal to any other connected nerve-cell, so that individual time-intervals 
between excitations are stochastic, code no information, and instead, stimuli distinguishable by 
neuronal model are represented as distinguishable statistical information about time-intervals, 
namely, probability-distribution functions with different combinations of barrier and drift-
coefficient which generate such time-intervals: “neuron is thus processor of stochastic dendritic 
events which displays its computed output as statistics of sequence of inter-spike intervals” 
(Berger et al 1990; Berger & Pribram 1992; 1993; King, Pribram, & Xie 1994).   
“Attention” or selective perception of simultaneously present stimuli of different kinds, 
and “anticipation,” or speculative responsiveness to expected stimuli has been know to exist, but 
anatomical apparatus involves in such processes occurred was not know (Condillac 1754a; 
1754b). Actually, in mammals: afferent nervous fibers in optic nerve transmit excitations from 
retina to visual cortex in the brain, but efferent fibers optic nerve transmit excitations from 
central nervous system to retina, changing excitation pattern response to environmental stimuli in 
the retina as function of neuronal model M ; for instance, visual stimuli which have already 
ceased to exist, but earlier were significant cause of excitations, evoke responses in the retina, 
and auditory and tactile stimuli, which modify neuronal model, then modify excitation patterns 
in the retina whose cause is visual stimuli (Brouwer 1933; Pribram, Spinelli, & Weingarten 
1965; Spinelli & Weingarten 1966a; 1966b). Such “centrifugal control” of excitation of nerve-
cells is present in muscle-cells and many periphery nerve-cells or receptors are excited or 
inhibited by environment, which have both afferent fibers leading away from them to brain stem 
and central nervous system and efferent fibers leading to them from brain stem and central 
nervous system, permitting self-stimulation at periphery, eliminating possibility of any “pure” 
experience controlling learning, and allowing environmental noise to be filtered out by central 
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nervous system control of firing of muscle-cells and periphery nerve-cells (Granit 1955). Stimuli 
which are present may be ignored, evoking no excitations beyond periphery nerve-cells. Stimuli 
which are absent may be perceived, evoking many excitations beyond periphery nerve-cells. As 
neuronal model M  changes, which stimuli evoke which sensations changes; whether or not two 
different stimuli evoke sensation of single stimuli or two distinguishable stimuli depends on state 
of neuronal model M  (Hayek 1952; Sokolov 1960a; 1960b). We see, then, that: 
1.   must be height of barrier that must be reached by random-walk model before nerve-
cells pass excitation threshold and fire, while   must be drift-coefficient in random walk model; 
these experimentally measurable variable-quantities and only these are found to fully describe 
representation of stimuli in any way as responses of M  to stimuli, taking every other part of 
M already into account; there are no other alternatives which have not been excluded; 
12.  ,  , , 1    M ; in humans,   and   are probably determined by activation-
inhibition network in temporal cortex, which categorizes stochastic processes underlying 
imaging (Pribram 1991), but 1  and 1  are likely determined by activation-inhibition network 
in frontal cortex, because lesions there much significantly than lesions in posterior cortex impair 
ability to notice and use visual cues or to associate emotions, such as humor, with sensations of 
stimuli in order to then use those associations to recall sensations (Pribram & Prigatano 1981); 
3. network of linkages of nerve-cells has statistical metric (Menger 1942), because of 
statistical nature of information and perception as it exists within central nervous system of 
humans and other mammals. 
So, then, “pleasure is not activity of particular structures in nervous system, nor is it 
particular kind of pattern of cerebral organization; pleasure is growth or development of cerebral 
organization” (Hebb 1949). “Satiety” or “emotion,” which determines when behavior “stops” is 
mostly determined in forebrain, in amygdala; “motivation,” which determines when behavior 
“begins,” when to “go,” or when to “continue going” is mostly determined in striatum of basal 
ganglia (Hebb 1949; Pribram 2003). Cerebral cortex determines actions, because it determines 
memory (and thus, perception, pleasure, pain), but it neither initiates behavior, which is done in 
basal ganglia hippocampus and striatum, nor interrupts behavior and so that other actions may 
begin, which is done in amygdala, and then, hippocampus determines “attitudes” or classes of 
ordered pairs of motivation and emotion (Pribram 2006).  
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We see that rankings of equivalence classes which are mapped by central nervous system 
to its perceived environment are topological, i.e., there is quantitative measure of “nearness” or 
“distance” between elements in space. Sensation of stimulus diminishes if stimulus is repeated, 
because “memory” or neuronal model M  of anticipated stimuli, environment, and self is 
constructed over time by experience through connections and positions of nerve-cells in cerebral 
cortex, and maps particular sensations to particular stimuli, what parts of environment are 
perceived and how they are perceived, but widespread lesions to cerebral cortex do not destroy 
any part of neuronal model already formed; “memory” does not change after lesions, but lesion 
significantly decrease rate of “learning,” i.e., rate at which neuronal model M  changes (Lashley 
1929; Sokolov 1958; 1960a; 1960b; Pribram 1966). When lesions occur, functions of destroyed 
parts of cerebral cortex, periphery nerves, and visual cortex, unless quantitative damage is very 
extensive, are moved to another part of brain and gradually return, e.g., “we see with brain, not 
with eyes” (Lashley 1929; 1948; Frank & Lashley 1934; Hayek 1952; Bach-y-Rita 1967; Bach-
y-Rita & Collins 1970; Bach-y-Rita, Tyler, & Kaczmarek 2003). 
Thus, “nearness” and “distance” quantitatively determine structure of central nervous 
system, structure of neuronal model, and products of metabolic and repair processes occurring in 
central nervous system, but pleasure or pain evoked by any stimulus are totally invariant to 
quantitative structure and changes in quantitative structure; gross destruction and change in 
quantitative structure experimentally produce no change in memory, so that pleasure or pain 
evoked by any environmental stimulus is determined only by change or growth of connections 
which determine relative position of elements in space, but not upon quantitative differences in 
relative position of elements in space (Lashley 1929; Hebb 1949; Hayek 1952). Metric  is 
required to indicate “nearness” and “distance” between equivalences-classes of distinguishable 
things in perceived environment (Rosen 1976; 1977) while satisfying above constraints. This 
results in hierarchical and ordinal nature of preferences concerning all different permutations of 
distinguishable stimuli (Cuhel 1907). Cost, then, is “regret of forgone opportunity,” namely, next 
greatest preference in immediate future which could have alternatively been satisfied by 
behavior, and must be forgone in immediate future if greatest preference, and present behavior is 
carried out instead of it (Condillac 1754a; 1754b).  
F
Supposedly, activation-inhibition networks sometimes generate “heterarchies” of values, 
( ')F   > ( '')F   > ( ''')F   > ( ')F  , where some entity prefers state '  of perceived environment 
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E  instead of '' , prefers ''  instead ''' , but prefers '''  instead of ' , e.g., mouse prefers food 
over sex, sex over avoidance of electric shock, and avoidance of electric shock over food 
(McCulluch 1945a; 1945b; 1956). Actually, “coarse” measurement which records physically and 
perceptually distinguishable changes in quantities of things or different stimuli which evoke 
distinguishable responses as if they were identical changes in quantities of things or identical 
stimuli, makes “heterarchies” of values appear to exist. Any “coarse” topology ( ')F   > ( '')F   > 
(F ''')  > ( ')F  , and hypothetical activation-inhibition network which generates it, through 
“refinement” of measurement, is revealed to be “finer” topology ( ' ')F    > ( ' '') F   > 
 >  with corresponding actual activation-inhibition network (e.g., 
Rosen 1976; 1977). And this is why David Hume warned that any subjects of inquiry must be 
quantified: bread is never preferred to water, and water is never preferred to bread; concrete 
changes in quantities of bread are preferred to concrete changes in quantities of water, but other 
changes in quantities of water are preferred to other changes in quantities of bread, which is of 
course old news (North 1690; Condillac 1776; Lloyd 1834; Gossen 1854; Jevons 1871; Menger 
1871). So, pleasure is “network of neurons is becoming more and more organized,” pain is 
“disruption” of such increasing organization, and emotion is “disruption” of “behavior,” either to 
prolong or preserve “pleasant stimulus” or to avoid or remove “painful stimulus” (Hebb 1949).  
(F
A
'  ''') (F '' ' '''')    
( ,P A
'
)B
For instance, consider one alternative model of preferences and how it is contradicted by 
such considerations. Possible actions  are chosen over time, so that Ч     chooses 
 with probability  and 
,A B, ,C D 
B  with probability  = 1 (P B, )A   , so that if  
> , then  is preferred to 
( , )P A B ( ,P A B)
1/ 2 A B , leading to utility-function U  according to which [  > 
 = [   ( )  > U C  
( , )P A B
( , D)]P C (U A)  U B ( )   ( )  (Debreu 1958). Probability is frequency, or 
infinite wave-train, or, at least, precisely identical choices must be repeated many times for 
function  to be defined (Gabor 1946). What contradicts any possibility of function  and 
corresponding function U , in such sense, is that activation-inhibition network is being modified 
at synapses at level of dendrites after every action and sensation, and inhibitory background, 
treated as field, is also changing after each and every action and sensation; every situation where 
choices must be made is unique, and pleasure is “growth” of neural network, which is precisely 
how learning occurs (Hebb 1949; Pribram 1991). Principle of “computational equivalence” 
means, furthermore, that we cannot simulate a priori repetition of events in 
]U D
P P
*E E and , which 
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actually happen uniquely insofar as M  is concerned, to obtain  and U , because complex 
systems cannot have their future output computed in shorter way than trajectory in their 
underlying dynamics required to obtain such output; “no shortcut is possible” (Hayek 1952; 
Rosen 1962; Wolfram 1985; Wolfram 2002). “Complexity” of system  is measured by number 
 of alternative models of system  which are not isomorphic, all being required to explain 
behavior of system  or all being different ways in which we may interact with system , so 
that any complex system  has bifurcations in behavior, e.g., people make radical changes in 
their trajectories (Rosen 1979). We measure complexity by , so that “simple” systems 
have “complexity”  = , while “complex” systems have “complexity”  > 0. Metric 
 lends itself to describing complex systems, which minds are, because it may generate sets not 
consistently related in real-space but only consistently related in complex-space. 
P
N
S
N
F
S
S
log
S
)
S
0
2log
2 1 2log N
By seeing how people actually rank different stimuli in terms of ordered pairs ( ,  , we 
gain data about form of 1F  1F  1F  1 and . Whatever data we collect has  and F 
, )
 fit to 
describe such data, because every distribution may be described in such way. Whole hierarchies 
of values of infinitely many different stimuli are distinguished and represented at-a-glance by 
assigning different diagrams with two degrees of freedom to different ordered pairs (  . 
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Figure 1. For any person, at-a-glance representations of different hierarchies of 
values. If any one ranking changes, every other ranking changes, because ranking 
is relative, which agrees with observed difficulty and discomfort of making 
decisions concerning stimuli encountered for first time (e.g., Wheeler 1920). 
 
By associating different partitions 
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diagrams of such kind, and thus seeing how observable-pairs which generate such diagrams are 
hierarchically-ranked or what order such ranges of diagrams, situations mapped to each of such 
classes, may be arranged in, i.e., by experimentally observing what order situations are preferred 
in, and knowing that such ranking are consistent for individual people, we learn something about 
1F   and 1F   which generate different rankings of stimuli for individual people when 
different classes of stimuli are present. We see how individual people rank or prefer different 
stimuli. By knowing that orienting reflex decreases when stimulus is repeated, due to growth at 
synapses resulting in lower resistance (one reason for decreasing marginal utility rule), we 
narrow down classifications. If {... , , , , ...}  is set of preferences, where … < 'V  <  
<  < … is hierarchy of values, and 
'V ''V '''V ''V
'''V h  is equivalence-class of restriction homomorphisms of 
kind '''' : ' 'R V V

   , where ''  is contained in ' , then values are outputs of kind of step-
function, which is not continuous, with singular points in between ranges of inputs:  
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,       
V J Я J Я
V J Я J Я
V J Я J Я
                                                 
h
h
h
 F
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It is possible to de-compose F  into sum of hyper-functions, which is defined by contour 
integration (from   to  ) of corresponding sum of impulses (Sato 1959; Isao 1992). Infinite 
sum (for all labels) of projections of values, which converges in complex-space, generates value 
hierarchy in real-space: 
   
F  =  … + 'V h 1,       ' ''
0,    ',  ''
Я Я
Я Я

 
     + ''V h
1,       '' '''
0,    '',  '''
Я Я
Я Я

 
      
                                    + '''V h 1,       ''' ''''
0,    ''',  ''''
Я Я
Я Я

 
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                              i  =  1    j  = 2 i    
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Then, two analytic functions exist, which are continuous and have derivatives defined for 
them, and we take  (for any one restriction), so that solution Fd *  is “decision” of what 
stimulus to respond to. That is, other stimuli are ignored until *  has been responded to, and 
such resulting behavior changes environment, presenting other stimuli, and next decision about 
what to respond to is then made in same way.    
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Singularities are locations in vector fields where directions of extensive magnitudes are 
not defined. Set of singular points {... , , , , ...}  are unique stimuli for which Ч  'Я ''Я '''Я     
has neither unique motivation nor unique behavior. It is set of unique stimuli for which Ч      
lacks unique responses. If such stimuli are encountered then instead of starting new motivation 
and its corresponding behavior in addition to present motivation and its corresponding behavior, 
emotion  =  +    =  would be evoked, which is excitation and its corresponding 
movement that disrupts present behavior by adding n  
e J Яn  Я J
Я    to       , depending which kind 
of emotion is evoked, so that  
 
( )    = e  =  Я + n 1,          
0,    ,   .
Я
Я Я

 
    
 
Emotion causes Ч    to stop present motivation and its corresponding behavior, 
merely allowing next or previous motivation and its corresponding behavior to be evoked (e.g., 
Hebb 1949, Pribram 2003; 2006). In not-conscious way, emotions-function e  “joins” together 
many separate parts or “patches” of memory into one preferences-function , which determines 
conscious decision-making, and would explain why lesions in brain that impair association of 
emotions and sensations makes remembering sensations and re-constructing past or present 
sensations in future much more difficult (e.g., Hebb 1949; Pribram & Prigatano 1981). Emotion 
evolved, because very quick transition between some one behavior and some other behavior 
made survival of individual much easier and more likely in many situations. Emotion is 
necessary for long-term memory and complicated preferences. If, however, people have 
necessary information to make valid decisions, but make “mistakes” anyway, or if they “panic,” 
this also is anticipated by analysis of singular points of .  
 
F
F
For identical stimuli (i.e., decoded labels     ), if  is index transformation or 
restriction which does not preserve hierarchical order … <  <  <  < …, then exchange 
or “trade” of things occurs between person Ч  

V
u
''V' '''V
    and person  ч     when  = , i.e., 
when  has all or some V
ЧF чF u
ЧF  ’s in reverse order of V ’s of , and extent of exchange is 
proportional to how many V
чF
 ’s are associated with different impulses, or number of different 
contradictions in    .  ЧF чF
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For person Ч    , if  [F(RA <   * < RA’) = ] = [F(RB < AV  * < RB’) = ], then what 
behavior is evoked? If system has unique solutions range, then it resists environmental gradient 
in any direction away from {
BV
*}J  but simultaneously moves in direction of { *J } . If system has 
several solutions ranges, then it resists environmental gradient in any direction away from { *}J  
but neither moves in direction corresponding to  nor moves in direction corresponding to 
, because choice cannot be made, for lack of reason, and but because reason exists for 
making one or other choice, however, it not resists environmental gradient in direction 
corresponding to  or environmental gradient in direction corresponding to , so that 
first perturbation of environment in direction of  or in direction of  determines 
choice. 
1F  AV
1
AF V

1
BF V

1F  AV
1
BF V

1
BVF

Neuronal model M  exists in form of probability-distribution functions described by 
statistical metric (Menger 1942; Berger & Pribram 1993). Our brain does not rank probabilities 
of outcomes, because situations are unique, but rather definite outcomes are manipulated in brain 
as probability distribution of intervals between excitations, in wave-like way. Overall metric of 
excitations however is responsible for computations, and when it changes, we would infer  
changes to compensate.  
F
Let us introduce notation for conciseness; “where it does not matter what we write, we 
write nothing at all” (Menger 1952). If distinguishable “slips”  = A  ...Abc z , B  = ...aBc z C  , 
= ...abC z , and so on, which are never found to be combined (they do not overlap), where X  = 
XX , XY  = YX , Xx  = o  (e.g., Jevons 1870; Yule 1912), are equivalence-classes of 
physical space *E , namely, different labels mapped to different points of excitation in cerebral 
cortex, then ( , )I A B  = ( , )I B A  is probability that excitation  is not-distinguishable from A B  in 
its ability to change   or  , so that, ( , ) 1I A A  , ( , ) ( , )I A B I B C  < ( , )I A C ; 
if we wish to perceive “nearness” and “distance,” in terms of effect upon   or  , then 
log ( , ) ( , ) ( , )I A B A B B A     , so that ( , ) 0A A  , ( , ) 0A B    ,   
;  
( , ( )A B)  ,B C 
( , )A C
if we wish to construct probabilistic ratios of measurable variable-quantities, e.g., 
(( , ), ),I A B C  (( , ), ( , )),I A B C D   (((...),...),...),I (( , ), ),A B C  (( , ), ( , )),A B C D   (((...),...),...),
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and so on, or if our knowledge of relations between elements of metric spaces  and  (which 
are sets of elements between which “nearness” and “distance” is actually defined) we may 
nevertheless determine whether metric spaces '  and  are identical or different by measuring 
frequencies; they are distinguishable if, for any ordered pair ( ,
'S ''S
S ''S
)   of elements A  , B  , 
, ',S S ''   , cumulative distribution function 'AB  (which generates ' ) and cumulative 
distribution function  (which generates S ) are distinguishable; 
S
''AB ''
( ;X , )A B A B X  is probability that distance from element  to element  is , so that 
,  (distance between any element and any identical or not-distinguishable 
element, such as itself, is 0, which is less than any given positive distance 
( ; , )X A A 1 X 0
X  whatever); 
( ;X A, )B  0 X, , distance between any given element and any different or 
distinguishable element is neither negative, nor 0 (which is distance between any given element 
and any identical or not-distinguishable element, which is itself); 
0
( ;X , ) ( ; , )A B X B A   , so 
that distance from  to B  and distance from BA  to  are identical (Menger 1942; Menger 
1951a; Menger 1951b).  
A
If a person behaves differently after environment Xy  is substituted for environment xY , 
they prefer Xy  to xY  or they prefer xY o  t Xy , w [ (V ( [V  
( )V xY ]; if a person behaves identically after environment 
ritten )  > Xy ) ]V xY ( )Xy  < 
Xy  is substituted for environment 
xY , they do not distinguish environment Xy  from environment xY ten V X  = ( )V xY . If 
space of physical environ nts is *E , and space of perceived environments is E , then: 
on *E ME  is restriction of *E  to E  by injection *E  into neur al model 
, writ
me
(
o
)y
ncompositi M ; 
ion Б ME  is restriction of E  to space of behaviors by injection E  again, into  ,composit M  
(Pribram 1958; Sokolov 1960a; Sokolov 1960b). Supposing ( ; , )X A B  describes distances in 
geometry of 2N  such elements all stochastically scattered according to another probability-
density function, neuronal model M  is, at one level, physical dynamics realizing edge-function 
RG , according to which, elements whose “distance” X  from each other is X R  are connected 
and excite each other (Penrose 2003) RG ( ; , ). Composition X A B  must thus also tell us how to 
specify step-function F  according to internal observation route, which describes channels and 
connection reas lizing M .  
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§3 
 Sums are defined for generalized functions. If  proper time   is fixed, then demand for 
any group of people is pre-sheaf of elements in space E  corresponding to sequence 
1
, , ,,     0
 [ lim Ч Ч ЧЧ F    
  
     1, , , ]Ч Ч ЧF       in union with every restriction homomorphism 
1
, , ,
    0
[ lim 'Ч Ч ЧF   
   
 
  , 1, ,'Ч Ч ЧF       ] 
'
''R

   ,1, ,Ч Ч
    0
[ lim ЧF ''  
    1, ,Ч Ч     , ''ЧF     
  ] 
which preserves hierarchical order of values, and where proper time   in effect determines 
resolution and must be selected to be sufficiently small, and ''  is contained  ' in  . Individuals 
are obtained, then, by taking cross-sections. Is demand a sheaf, which would allow further 
analysis, by guaranteeing invariance under wide range of morphisms? That depends on whether 
sequence of stimuli and responses is “exact” sequence. 
Degrees of freedom are different ways which ambiguously maximum satisfaction, but are 
not locally determined in society: behavior of any one person affects behavior of any other 
person, changing behavior required for both to obtain maximum satisfaction (Rashevsky 1958). 
If every possible sequence  of injections   between different 
people , [1 = 
0 * ... 0Ц ЩE Ч Ч    
1,..., ,...,Ц ЩЧ Ч Ч  Ц  = ]  [1 < Щ  Ц  < ] Щ   , is “exact,” because 
[ I

m  ЧЦ  Ker ЦЧ  = ]  [  = Ker Im  ЦЧ ЦЧ  ], then behavior of Ч , which is group 
of different people, is “smooth,” and degrees of freedom are not reduced.  
...Ц ЩЧ 
If exactness of such sequences exists, then { }, ( , )Э PH E   is P-th sheaf co-homology group 
of space  with coefficients in sheaf E  , which refers to such sequences. That is, “smooth” 
behavior of many people means they are “society” of people. In the inductive limit, we may 
consider, demand and supply generated by many people as hyper-function defined on real-
manifold  comprising of sum of  where Ч  = {... ,  m ЧF 'Ч    ,  ''Ч   ,     '''Ч  , … } 
(e.g., Sato 1960). 
In any such “exact” sequence, output (response) of any one person is input (stimulus) of 
any other person for which other person also has response. If other person has no response for 
response of previous person to some input, then society breaks-down at that point. There are 
situations where degrees of freedom are lost, e.g., violence, because no response to violence will 
create stimulus to next person for which next person has solutions which do not diminish their 
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own degrees of freedom, in this sense. Division of labour is more productive than isolated work, 
but any loss of exactness in any such sequence would, among other things, diminish division of 
labour and extent of market. Exactness is measure of peaceful cooperation of different people, 
based on division of labour, whereby different preferences requiring work of many different 
individuals to satisfy are simultaneously satisfied. If one person has no response to stimulus 
which is itself response of another person, then emotional interruption of behavior, as defined 
earlier, or violence, will begin at that point (Hebb 1949). 
Social conventions, such as division of labour, which are invariant to particular values 
individuals hold, satisfy exactness of any such sequences, because whatever individuals decide to 
do, such social conventions are more productive than alternatives, such as isolated labour. 
Supply arises in this way. However, nothing in M     makes [ IЧ m  ЦЧ   = ]  
[ I  = Ker 
Ker ЦЧ 
m  ЦЧ ЦЧ  ] certain to hold, and most social conventions do not result in exactness of 
sequences. Human society, if compared to animal group in general, is exceptional when it has 
social conventions which result in exact sequences.  
In animal group, individuals quickly learn (by attacking one another) to avoid and not 
retaliate against some individuals and to not avoid and retaliate against other individuals, 
resulting in domination directed downward along ranking and submission directed upward along 
ranking. In animal group want satisfaction of higher ranking individuals is obtained without 
voluntary cooperation and at expense of preference satisfaction of lower ranking individuals, and 
only preferences which may be satisfied by working alone or by attacking, chasing away, or 
stealing property from lower ranking individuals are satisfied at all. In monkey group, for 
instance, domination and submission ranking of every one individual relative every other 
individual is quickly established in any environment through aggression of one against other 
directed downward from higher ranking individuals at lower ranking animals, and lower-ranking 
individuals avoid or neither retaliate nor resist against violent behavior of higher-ranking 
individuals; out-group individuals either were totally dominated by all in-group individuals and 
obtained lowest ranking, by learning to avoid or not-retaliate against all in-group individuals, or 
out-group individuals totally dominated all in-group individuals and obtained highest ranking, by 
learning to attack all in-group individuals, never anything in between; removal of amygdala 
usually disrupted formation of domination habits, and caused constant fighting, until such habit 
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were re-learned (Brody & Rosvold 1952; Pribram 1954). This is a very distant picture from what 
human society looks like, in modern times at least.  
 
If  = A B , and you substitute  for A B , you do not get anything more than you started 
with, and because everything may be expressed as dynamical equations through equality, there is 
conservation of energy. Production is only creation of value by transformation of matter from 
one form to other, more useful form. Production is not creation of matter. If we define behavior 
*Б  and time   as equivalent to some boundary transitions, their role as inputs to production and 
as stimuli may be investigated.  
If  = 0, Q    , economic goods are inputs and outputs, and value of factors of 
production derives from value of their product, which is labeled as being of “lower order” 
' ''i i 
JO or 
“nearer to consumption” (Menger 1871), then neither domain nor range of production process  
 
… + ', ' 'OQ F '  i  + '', '' '' ''OQ F   i  + … = … + (o ' , ' 'OQ F  '   i  + '' , '' '' ''OQ F     i  + …) 
 
are “created.” This function is computed by previous analysis, and coefficients are determined by 
technology .They are elements of complex space, mapped in different ways onto itself. 
Topological space is not itself changed by different mappings from one part of it to any other 
part of it. In fact, only new arrangements (e.g., of neural network), or ideas, can be created. 
There are infinitely many such alternatives and these are functions  
o
o   M , physiologically.  
Technology is recipe, but it is also capital good, because time must be spent acquiring it, 
and skills must be learned over to time to make use of it. Part of present income is thus spent to 
produce future consumption. Part of present income must therefore be “saved,” or allocated in 
this way. There is always some part of present income which is consumed, else people would 
never consume, which contradicts definition of having preferences. Parts of “influence structure” 
of this function which comprises of first partial derivatives gives marginal contribution of each 
factor of production to each product, and thus determines its value. We may abbreviate this by 
writing (o * *,Б I ), when we decode stimuli labels arising from behavior of people.  
We can “discover” new functions or mapping between different parts of topological 
space. We can physically create new technology to produce economics goods, but when we 
produce economics goods, we do not physically create anything new. There are many ways to 
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produce anything, and from this, we derive concept of “substitution”; and many technologies are 
only useful as sequences, not individually, from which we may derive concept of 
“complementary” ideas (Jewkes et al 1958). That is, [ ' '' ...] o o ( * *,Б I ) is defined. 
Social conventions so fixed, supply is  * *, , ,, ( ,Ч Ч ЧЧ )Б I   o    * , with coefficients in 
, and again, we may investigate this with differential operators. This visually is kind of phase-
space, where different results of different behaviors are different areas and have multiple ways of 
being reached, and reflects distribution of different economics goods available in society.  
E

Most work which is not trivial, then, goes into determining internal statistical indicators 
  and   for different individuals. Much of interpretation depends on how we select coverings 
of , which are equivalence-classes {*E }[ { ,..., '}]J N K   , { }[ { '',..., '''}]J N K K  , …, 
{ J }[ { '''',..., }]N K   , and so on, into which stimuli are grouped. Results of behaviors 
corresponding to such different equivalence classes are different “industries.” Results of 
analysis, again, need only to be computed for any one restriction to be valid for all of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§4 
Conclusion. 
Mathematical basis which applies to choice-rich situations of infinitely many different 
stimuli, where pleasure is state of mind and so we do not arbitrarily classify preferences as 
selfish or not selfish, but merely as changes of state of mind as responses to different 
hierarchically-ordered stimuli, and where all existing true propositions of economics follow from 
mathematical basis itself without additional extra-mathematical assumptions, is presented.  
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Models of decision-making derived from such new mathematical basis are not only 
consistent with results of all experiments in physiology so far, but also quantitatively relate 
experimentally obtained physiological observables with predictions of economic models so 
constructed: variable-quantities in such models precisely correspond to observables which 
determine statistical properties of central nervous system. We wish to model decision-making in 
our world as it exists, to relax assumptions which prevent our model of decision-making from 
applying to actual decision-making in our world; we cannot assume, therefore, for instance, that 
order of consumption of different things is fixed before decisions to consume bundles of very 
many different quantities of things are made or contents of bundles are determined. We must be 
able to fill out our model by measuring physiological observables; if we do not incorporate 
physiological observables into our model, many routes of investigation of human decision-
making are not available, and we cannot smoothly pass from model of how brain is working to 
model of decision-making. If physiological observables fit fundamentally into our model of 
decision-making, new experimental, mathematical, statistical methods of investigation are found 
to become available, new graphical methods for quick manipulation of large amounts of 
observational data become possible, and existing knowledge is re-expressed in robust way, 
increasing number of aspects of decision making open to analysis.   
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